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The demand for current public expenditure in Fiji: theory and empirical 
results* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses current government expenditure in Fiji using annual time series data for 
the period 1969-1999. Alternative theories of government expenditure are reviewed and a 
distinction is made between economic/apolitical determinants and institutional/political 
determinants. Categorising the literature in this way suggests the application of non-nested 
tests in empirical work, which is reported elsewhere. All non-nested tests lead to the 
conclusion of double rejection. Therefore, a parsimonious comprehensive model, 
encompassing both economic and institutional variables, is preferred as it passes all 
diagnostic tests and exhibits no sign of misspecification. The Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure has been applied to analyse both long- and short-run determinants of public 
expenditure. The paper presents the first empirical estimates of the own-price elasticity of 
demand and income elasticity of demand for current public expenditure in Fiji. 
 
Introduction 
Fiji became independent in 1970 with Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister after nearly 
a century as a British colony. Fiji had a population of 801000 in 1999 and has been classified 
as a lower middle income country by the World Bank, with a per capita annual income of 
US$2310 (World Bank, 2001). Although it is one of the most developed of the Pacific island 
economies, it still has a large subsistence sector and the economy can be regarded as 
dualistic. Sugar and clothing are the main (commodity) export industries. Political 
uncertainties have created economic uncertainties. Coups in 1987 and more recently in May 
                                                 
*
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2000 have created an economic environment which is not conducive to long-term investment 
as a result of poorly-defined property rights and migration of skilled workers (Gani, 1998). 
For an account of recent economic events see Chand (1998) and for political and 
constitutional events see Lal and Lamour (1997). 
Given this turbulent recent history concerning governance it is relevant to apply 
contemporary public finance theories on the determinants of the size of the government 
sector. The objective of this paper is to do just that. 
Since the pioneering studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) the analysis of the size of the government sector has ceased to be 
characterised by the atheoretical or ad hoc analyses that were dominant until then.  For 
bibliographies of the early literature see Pryor (1968: 46-51) and Borcherding (1977: 67-70).  
Essentially the modern analysis of the demand for goods and services provided by 
government involves an application of the median voter hypothesis, associated with Downs 
(1957). This conception will be referred to below as ‘the economic/apolitical model’. 
In essence the demand for public goods is conceived of as the outcome of the demand 
for public goods by the median voter, or as Borcherding (1985) puts it, by “the Fiscal 
Everyman”.  Put otherwise, the demand for government expenditure is to be seen as a 
function of the characteristics of the median voter.  This conceptual framework leads to a 
relatively parsimonious specification of the explanatory variables in the demand equation.  
Those factors are as follows: prices, income and population, as well as some other relevant 
variables.  For an exposition see, inter alia, Larkey, Stolp and Winer (1981), Mueller (1989) 
and Brown and Jackson (1986). 
This conceptual framework is, by no means, the only theory of government 
expenditure.  For instance, Wagner (1883) had argued that the public sector expands as the 
structure of the economy changes and as income rises through time; Peacock and Wiseman 
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(1967) have argued that government expenditure is subject to a “displacement effect” 
associated with some crisis such as war; and Nordhaus (1975) has argued that government 
expenditure (and other macroeconomic variables) are subject to “political business cycles”.  
It is not our purpose here to enumerate these numerous theories and/or create a new 
classification scheme.  See for example Lybeck (1986) for a 12-fold classification of such 
theories, Henrekson (1988) for a categorisation of demand and supply side determinants and 
Mueller (1989: 320-47) for a five-fold classification scheme. 
The approach adopted in this paper is to categorise explanatory variables of 
government expenditure as being of an economic/apolitical kind or of an 
institutional/political nature.  This dual scheme has been employed by Borcherding (1985) 
and Halsey and Borcherding (1997).  Such a formulation suggests a means by which an 
indication of the relative importance of these two models can be established.  Viewing 
explanatory variables in this way invites the application of non-nested econometric tests. 
A second important approach to explain government expenditure is what is referred to 
below as “the institutional model”. This approach covers a wide range of issues such as the 
political business cycle (Rogoff, 1990), political unrest/revolt (such as the coups of 1987-
1988 and 2000), macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation, the power of 
pressure groups (Tullock, 1959, Stigler, 1970, Olson, 1982, Mueller and Murrell, 1986, and 
Marlow and Orzechowski, 1996), fiscal illusion (Buchanan, 1967), and incrementalism 
(Wildavsky, 1964). Also, it should be recognised that exogenous shocks, such as the oil 
embargo of 1973 and 1974, can have important repercussions on government expenditure.    
The structure of this paper is as follows: The next section presents a theoretical 
framework for the analysis. The following section provides a brief account of the structure of 
the government sector in Fiji and some relevant time series data on the phenomena to be 
explained. The penultimate section discusses the time series properties of the data and 
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econometric results of the Engle-Granger two-step procedure. Some concluding remarks will 
be presented in the final section. 
 
Theoretical framework and estimation procedure 
It is not our purpose here to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the demand for public goods: such a review is provided recently in 
Doessel and Valadkhani (2002). We provide here only a brief outline of the framework of the 
estimating procedure we have adopted.  
 
The economic/structural model 
Following Gemmell (1990), the demand for real government expenditure can be stated as 
follows: 
( )Gt gt yt t t    A P   P   Y  POP    POP t= β β β β1 2 3 4/
       (1) 
where Gt is real government consumption expenditure, 
 A is a constant, 
 Pgt is the price of government-provided goods and services, as measured by the 
government price deflator, 
 Pyt is the price of private goods and services as measured by the GDP deflator, 
 Yt is real GDP, 
 POPt is population, and 
 β1, β2, β3 and β4 are elasticities to be estimated. 
 This equation bears a close resemblance to the formulations in Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). For details see Gemmell (1990). Our 
actual estimating equation is as follows: 
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20 1 3 4
5 1( )
ln( ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( ) ln( )
              
gt yt t tt t t
t tDV coup
G P P Y POP POP AGEMRβ β β β β
β ε
= + + + + +
+
       (2) 
where AGEMR is the ratio of agricultural employment to total employment, DV(Coup) is an 
intercept dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the coups of the 1987-1988 
period, and zero otherwise, and ε1 is a well-behaved error term. 
A brief explanation for the inclusion of these explanatory variables was in the previous 
section. 
 
The institutional model 
An important advance in the study of the public sector occurred in the 1950s, when some 
economists applied the tools of their trade to non-market decision making, i.e. economic 
theory was applied to issues which had previously been in the domain of political science. 
This development, initiated by, inter alia, Black (1948), Downs (1957), and Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), is now generally referred to as "public choice". See Mueller (1989) for a 
comprehensive account of this approach. 
 An important conclusion from the public choice school is that the outcomes of the 
public sector are determined, in part, by institutions, their procedures and the people working 
in those institutions. In other words, fiscal institutions can determine outcomes. This 
seemingly trite point, i.e. that institutions matter, is central to the public choice literature. As 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 636) put it "We are institutionalists in the sense that we think 
that arrangements or rules do affect outcomes." 
 The institutional model we are estimating can be specified as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 2
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
             ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ( )
t t t t t
t t yt t
G EDV U SEREMR OPEN
HHIT DTAXR P DV coup
α α α α α
α α α α ε
= + + + + +
+ + ∆ + +
    (3) 
where EDV is an intercept dummy variable which equals unity when there has been an 
election, and zero otherwise,  
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 SEREMR is the ratio of service employment to total employment, 
 OPEN is an index of openness as defined by total exports and imports divided by 
GDP, 
 U is the rate of unemployment, 
 HHIT is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Hirschman, 1964) of tax complexity, 
 DTAXR is the ratio of direct taxes to total taxes, and 
 ∆ln(Py) is the inflation rate using the GDP price deflator. 
 
 A rationale for these explanatory variables was considered briefly in the introductory 
section. For a more detailed account of the literature on the theoretical underpinning of these 
explanatory variables see Doessel and Valadkhani (2002). Table 1 summarises both the 
notation to be employed in this study and the expected theoretical signs of the relevant 
explanatory coefficients in both the economic/structural model and the institutional model. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Estimation procedure 
The empirical procedure has been to estimate equation (2) and equation (3) 
separately. These two equations performed quiet well in terms of goodness-of-fit, most of the 
coefficients being statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level), and having the expected 
theoretical signs. However, there were some diagnostic tests which indicated misspecification 
in the institutional model and serious autocorrelation in the economic model. Furthermore, 
the application of non-nested tests [the Cox test, the Ericsson Instrumental Variable (IV) test, 
the Sargan restricted/unrestricted reduced form test, and the encompassing (F) test, Hendry 
and Doornik (1999)], to these separate models explaining government expenditure, indicate 
rejection of each model. Essentially these results signify that an explanation of government 
expenditure in Fiji cannot be found in either a solely institutional/political model or a pure 
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economic/apolitical model. These non-nested test results and estimated equations (2) and (3), 
not reported here, have been published elsewhere (Doessel and Valadkhani, 2002). Therefore, 
attention is now directed to the specification and estimation of a comprehensive model 
including all the variables in both models. We have applied general-to-specific econometric 
methodology to estimate the following comprehensive model, which captures the long-run 
determinants of public expenditure: 
0
6 7 8 9
10 11 12
21 3 4
5
ln( ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( ) ln( )
( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
             ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
              
t gt yt t t t t
t t t t t
t t yt t
G P P Y POP POP AGEMR
DV coup EDV U SEREMR OPEN
HHIT DTAXR P e
λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + ∆ +
   (4) 
An important step before estimating equation (4) is to determine the time series 
properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use of non-stationary data in the 
absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression results. To this end, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test has been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise, of the 
time series data. It was found that all the time series variables in equation (4) were I(1), or 
stationary after first differencing. In this paper the lowest value of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) has been used as a guide to determine the optimal lag length in the ADF 
regression. These lags are added to the ADF regression to ensure that the error term is white 
noise. It is worth emphasising that since there are only 31 annual observations for the various 
variables studied in this paper, the unit root test results should be taken with a pinch of salt as 
the ADF test is appropriate for large samples. 
Let us assume that all the variables in equation (4) are I(1) and the resulting residuals 
are I(0). According to Engle and Granger (1987), it can then be stated that there exists a 
corresponding error-correction mechanism (ECM or et-1) model of the following form: 
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 (5) 
 
where γji are the estimated short-term coefficients; θ represents the feedback effect or the 
speed of adjustment whereby short-term dynamics converge to the long-term equilibrium 
path formulated in equation (4); δi denotes the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable to ensure that vt or the disturbance term is white noise; e, or the ECM, is obtained 
from equation (4), and ∆ indicates the first-difference operator.  
The general-to-specific methodology can be used to omit insignificant variables in 
equation (5) on the basis of a battery of maximum likelihood tests. In this method, joint zero 
restrictions are imposed on explanatory variables in the unrestricted (general) model to obtain 
the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation process. However, one may 
argue that the Engle-Granger method is appropriate if there are only two variables in the 
cointegrating equation. In other words, if there are more than two variables, it is possible that 
there could exist more than one cointegrating relationship between the variables, rendering 
the Engle-Granger two step procedure inadequate. To address this issue the multivariate 
Johansen cointegration technique was initially used to determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors. However, given the lack of long and consistent time series data (i.e only 31 
observations), the Johansen method is also inappropriate, as the cointegration results, with 
only 31 observations, were very sensitive to the lag length, the inclusion or exclusion of the 
intercept term, or a trend in the cointegration equation, and/or the VAR specification. It 
should be noted that the max-eigenvalue and trace tests on equation (4) indicate that there is 
one cointegrating vector at the 1 per cent level. In these tests we have allowed only one lag 
and an term in the cointegrating vector and the VAR but with no trend in the cointegrating 
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vector and the VAR model. The multivariate cointegration test results have not been reported 
here but they are available from the authors upon request.   
 
Some relevant time series data on government in Fiji 
As mentioned previously Fiji is categorised as a lower middle income country by the World 
Bank.  Unlike federations such as the US, Canada, Australia and Germany, Fiji has a 
government structure which consists of only a central government and a (relatively small) 
local government sector.  In this respect it is similar to the United Kingdom (pre-devolution) 
and New Zealand. 
This study employs aggregate data on all public expenditure. It would be desirable if 
we could separate government expenditure (say) on the security system and defence, given 
that governments may make decisions on defence expenditure in a quiet different way from 
civilian expenditure. However, such a disaggregation of the data is not available for the 1969-
1999 period. This creates an apples-and-oranges problem which we cannot resolve. Data 
limitations preclude a disaggregated analysis. 
Figure 1 presents time series data on real GDP and real government current 
expenditure (in 1989 constant prices) for the period analysed in this study, 1969-1999.  It is 
clear that GDP has experienced some fluctuations through time.  Note the decrease in GDP 
and government expenditure in 1987 and 1988. Figure 2 shows the plot of government and 
GDP deflators whereas Figure 3 presents a graph of real GDP per capita. As can be seen the 
impact of the 1987-1988 military coups on real GDP per capita is quiet evident. For further 
details on the structure of the Fiji economy see, inter alia, Kasper, Bennett and Blandy (1988) 
and Treadgold (1992). Table 2 presents descriptions of the data employed and summary 
statistics. 
[Figures 1 to 3 about here] 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Empirical results and policy implication of study 
As mentioned above it is very important to examine the time series properties of the data. The 
empirical results of the ADF unit root test are summarised in Table 3. According to the test 
results, all of the variables appearing in the estimated parsimonious equation reported in 
Table 4 are integrated of order one, I(1), and they become stationary after first differencing. 
Since all the variables in equation (4) are I(1), the Engle-Granger two-step procedure can be 
used to examine if this equation represents a long-term relationship.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the comprehensive long-run model of public 
expenditure in Fiji using the 1969-1999 data. As seen, all the estimated coefficients are 
significant at least at the 5 per cent level and have the expected theoretical signs.  This 
equation performs very well in terms of goodness-of-fit (adjusted R2 = 0.945) and passes the 
overall F test at the one per cent level. In addition, this equation passes each and every 
diagnostic tests. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
There are a number of important points that can be drawn from the estimated long-run 
coefficients of the public expenditure model.  First, the relative price coefficient (–0.67) 
indicates that the demand for government goods and services in Fiji is inelastic.  This 
coefficient is in the relevant range reported in the prior literature.  Second, the coefficient on 
per capita income (+0.94) indicates that the demand for public goods and services is normal: 
given that this coefficient is less than unity, there is no evidence that Wagner’s law applies in 
the context of Fiji. Third, this comprehensive model includes the measure of structural 
change (AGEMR) with the expected (and significant) negative coefficient (-0.34). This 
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means that in the long-run as the agricultural sector of the Fijian economy declines in relative 
importance, there is an increased demand for existing services, and/or a demand for new 
services, provided by government. 
Fourth, the variable (SEREMR), measuring interest group influence, is highly 
significant with a relatively larger long-run elasticity of 1.17. This is not counter-intuitive 
given the nature of government decision-making processes in Fiji. Borcherding’s (1985) 
inability to specify the numerical importance of the institutional variables did not indicate 
that such variables were irrelevant: this econometric analysis shows conclusively that 
“institutions matter” in terms of explaining the growth of recurrent government expenditure 
in Fiji. Fifth, it is also important to observe that the 1987-1988 military coups, as measured 
by DV(Coup), have exerted a highly significant adverse impact on government expenditure 
in Fiji.  
As mentioned earlier, insignificant variables, the taxation variables concerning fiscal 
illusion (i.e. HHIT, and DTAXR), EDV, OPEN and inflation, were omitted by applying 
several maximum likelihood tests involving joint restrictions on explanatory variables in 
order to obtain the most parsimonious and robust estimates. Also we have undertaken 
exhaustive diagnostic tests. (The estimated results have been obtained by using PcGive 9.21 
(Hendry and Doornik, 1999). 
Attention is now directed to the second stage of the Engle-Granger representation 
procedure.  Table 5 presents the estimated results of an error correction model (ECM) 
capturing short-run dynamics of public expenditure as formulated in equation (5). The 
general-to-specific methodology has been adopted in estimating equation (5) by omitting 
insignificant lagged variables and undertaking a battery of maximum likelihood tests. Joint 
zero restrictions have been imposed on insignificant explanatory variables in the unrestricted 
(or general model) to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation 
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process. The parsimonious short-term model of public expenditure includes all of the long-
term determinants of public expenditure except for U and DV(Coup). 
[Table 5 about here] 
 In other words, the results reported in Table 5 indicate that the short-run sources of 
the growth of public expenditure are changes in relative prices, per capita income, the ratio of 
agriculture employment to total employment, the ratio of service employment to total 
employment; and the lagged growth rate of public current expenditure. All the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 per cent level, with the only exception 
being ∆ln(G)t-1, and have the expected signs. Having the expected sign with a magnitude of 
0.27, the variable ∆ln(G)t-1 is a proxy to capture bureaucratic inertia or incrementalism. This 
variable is statistically significant at the 11 per cent level. In terms of goodness-of-fit 
statistics, though expressed in ∆ln, with an adjusted R2 of 0.332, the short-run dynamic 
equation performs reasonably well. As with equation (4), this equation also passes each and 
every diagnostic test. Table 5 also reveals that the feed-back coefficient (or adjustment speed) 
is as high as –0.873, indicating that in every year 87 per cent of the divergence between the 
short-run public expenditure growth from its long-run path, as formulated in equation (4), is 
eliminated. 
 The significance of this paper lies in the fact that it presents the first empirical 
estimates of the magnitudes of those factors that can explain current government expenditure 
in Fiji. Thus policy makers (and their bureaucrats) now have a means whereby they can 
predict the effect on government expenditure of changes in important determining variables 
of that expenditure. Hence, one of the “black holes” that had previously confronted Fiji’s 
policy makers is now subject to some light. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The existing literature of the demand for government goods and services is dominated by 
studies of western countries and services provided by state or local governments.  This study 
is “a little bit different” in that it is one of the first such studies of a middle income country,  
with a (single) government sector providing services generally supplied by central and state 
governments in other countries.  With respect to the first point it should not be automatically 
concluded that economic analysis of this kind is not applicable to a country such as Fiji: it 
should be recalled that Pryor (1968) succeeded in analysing government behaviour of 
countries with markedly different systems, and that Wagner and Weber (1975) successfully 
analysed governments with different organisational and behavioural (competition or 
monopoly) characteristics. 
The central focus of this paper is to provide an answer to the question posed by 
Borcherding (1985) concerning the relative importance of long- and short-run 
economic/apolitical and institutional/political factors in determining government expenditure 
in Fiji.  It is found that variables from both the institutional/political model and the 
economic/apolitical model of the determinants of the demand for government services are 
necessary. Thus, this study provides, not only further evidence that “institutions matter”, but 
that the conventional economic variables are also necessary to explain current government 
expenditure in Fiji. 
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Table 1  Economic/structural and institutional explanatory variables applied in the 
real demand for government expenditure in Fiji 
Variable name Variable definition Expected 
sign 
Economic/Apolitical 
  
Pg Government price deflator – 
Py GDP price deflator + 
Pg/Py Relative price ratio – 
Y/POP Real per capita GDP + 
POP Population zero or + 
AGEMR Ratio of agricultural employment to total 
employment – 
Institutional/Political 
  
Gt-1 or ∆Gt-1 Lagged real government expenditure (bureaucratic 
inertia or incrementalism) 
+ 
SEREMR Ratio of service employment to total employment + 
OPEN 
Index of openness defined as total exports plus 
imports, divided by GDP 
 
- 
∆ ln(Pyt) Inflation rate using GDP price deflator + 
U Unemployment rate + 
HHIT Hirschman-Herfindahl index of tax complexity – 
DTAXR Ratio of direct taxes to total taxes – 
EDV Election dummy variable + 
DV(Coup) Coup dummy variable (1987 and 1988) - 
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Figure 1   GDP and real government consumption expenditure (G), 
Fiji, 1969-1999, F$ million (1989 prices) 
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Source: World Bank (2001). 
Note: The left-hand scale indicates GDP (F$ million) and the right-hand 
scale measures government current expenditure (F$ million), both in 
constant 1989 prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Plot of government and GDP deflators, Fiji, 1969-1999, 
(1989=100) 
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Source: World Bank (2001). 
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Figure 3  Graph of real GDP per capita, Fiji, 1969-1999, (1989 F$) 
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Source: World Bank (2001). 
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Table 2  Summary statistics and description of the data employed, Fiji, 1969-1999 
Variables Unit Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
G Fijian $ (1989 prices) 272000000 91083667 106000000 431000000 
Pg/Py Ratio 1.03 0.08 0.83 1.17 
(Y/POP) Fijian $ (1989 prices) 2457 276 1747 2900 
POP Person 669627 91121 508000 801000 
AGEMR Ratio 3.5 1.5 1.77 7.4 
U Unemployment 
rate (%) 3.9 3.3 0.1 9.4 
SEREMR Ratio 64.0 5.0 52.2 72.0 
OPEN Ratio 1.04 0.15 0.80 1.30 
HHITa 1>HHIT>0 0.38 0.03 0.33 0.42 
DTAXRa Ratio 0.50 0.06 0.37 0.58 
∆ ln(Pyt) inflation rate (%) 7.1 6.1 0 25.9 
Sources: World Bank (2001), Asian Development Bank (1995), International Monetary Fund 
(various) and International Labour Office (various). 
Note: a The HHIT and DTAXR variables are calculable only for the period 1974-1996 due to the 
lack of data. 
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Table 3  ADF test results of the data employed in 
Tables 4 and 5, Fiji 
Variable 
C (constant) and 
T (trend) in the 
equation 
ADF test 
ADF 
statistics 
Optimum 
lag 
ln(G)t C & T -2.56 0 
∆ln(G)t C -5.87* 0 
ln(Pg/Py)t C & T -2.25 1 
∆ ln(Pg/Py)t C -5.51* 0 
ln(Y/POP)t C & T -3.34 0 
∆ ln(Y/POP)t C -6.21* 0 
ln(AGEMR)t C & T -3.09 0 
∆ ln(AGEMR)t C -7.00* 0 
ln(U)t C & T -1.53 0 
∆ ln(U)t C -5.15* 0 
ln(SEREMR)t  C & T -2.81 0 
∆ ln(SEREMR)t C -5.79* 0 
ECMt C & T -5.38* 0 
*
 indicates that, based on the MacKinnon critical values, 
the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 4  Empirical results for the long-run, ln(G)t, model, Fiji, 1969-1999 
Variable Estimated 
elasticities t-statistics
*
 Prob. Expected 
signs 
Intercept 7.575 2.7 [0.01]  
ln(Pg/Py)t -0.668 -2.2 [0.04] - 
ln(Y/POP)t 0.940 2.9 [0.01] + 
ln(AGEMR)t -0.345 -2.7 [0.01] - 
ln(U)t 0.043 2.5 [0.02] + 
 ln(SEREMR)t 1.174 2.2 [0.03] + 
DV(coup) -0.176 -2.9 [0.01] - 
Order of integration of the stochastic residuals: I(0) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: 
Adjusted R2=0.945 
Overall F statistic F(6,24) = 87 
Diagnostic tests: 
DW 1.79  
AR 1-2 F (2, 22) = 1.27    [0.30] 
ARCH 1 F (1, 22) = 0.55    [0.47] 
Normality χ2 (2)  =  0.09    [0.96] 
White Xi2 F (11, 12) = 0.99    [0.50] 
RESET F (1, 23) = 0.76    [0.39] 
Notes: a) * indicates that the standard errors of the coefficients have been 
corrected by the White HAC method before calculating t-ratios; b) figures in 
square brackets show the corresponding probabilities; and c) the estimated 
method is OLS. 
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Table 5  Empirical results for the short-run, ∆ln(G)t, model, Fiji, 1971-
1999 
Variable Estimated 
elasticities t-statistics
*
 Prob. Expected 
signs 
Intercept -0.001 0.0 [0.96]  
∆ln(Pg/Py)t -0.616 -3.3 [0.00] - 
∆ln(Y/POP)t 0.914 2.3 [0.03] + 
∆ln(AGEMR)t -0.224 -2.9 [0.01] - 
 ∆ln(SEREMR)t 0.811 2.3 [0.03] + 
∆ln(G)t-1, 0.271 1.6 [0.11] + 
ECMt-1 -0.873 -2.9 [0.01] - 
Order of integration of the stochastic residuals: I(0) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: 
Adjusted R2=0.332 
Overall F statistic F(6,22) = 3.3 
Diagnostic tests: 
DW 1.82  
AR 1-2 F (2, 20) = 0.84 [0.45] 
ARCH 1 F (1, 20) = 0.00 [0.97] 
Normality χ2 (2)  =  1.88 [0.39] 
White Xi2 F (12, 9) = 0.20 [0.99] 
RESET F (1, 21)=0.00 [0.98] 
Notes: a) * indicates that the standard errors of the coefficients have been 
corrected by the White HAC method before calculating t-ratios; b) figures in 
square brackets show the corresponding probabilities; and c) the estimated method 
is OLS. 
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